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1 |  INTRODUCTION: THE “GVC PERSPECTIVE” AND THE 
“DEVELOPMENTALIST PERSPECTIVE”
Since the early 1990s, a globalisation of production has taken place, driven by falling transport costs, 
advances in information and communication technology, and lower trade and investment barriers. 
From 1990 to 2017, the world's trade dependence ratio1 increased from 19.5% to 28.9% (see Figure 1 
for more details on trends in world trade), and world inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) as 
share of world GDP increased from 0.9% to 2.8% (World Development Indicators, 2019). The increase 
in FDI inflows has mostly taken place in developing countries,2 whose share of world FDI inflows 
surged from 17% to 46% between 1990 and 2017 (see Figure 2, which depicts the trend in absolute 
numbers as well). This growth in international trade and offshoring is underpinned especially by the 
fragmentation of production processes and the dispersion of tasks and activities within them. This has 
led to complex and borderless business networks and production systems, popularly referred to as 
global value chains (GVCs).
1 This is the average of imports and exports of goods and services, as share of GDP.
2 The term “developing countries” refers to those countries that face the challenge of late industrialisation (a concept 
introduced by Alice Amsden), that is those countries that face the challenge of catching up to the global technological 
frontier. The terms “developing countries,” “catch-up economies” and “late industrialisers” will be used somewhat 
interchangeably in this paper, but they essentially carry the same meaning. The important note to make is that this paper 
focuses on industrial policy in developing countries, as opposed to developed countries, as developing countries participate in 
GVCs and attract foreign investments in different ways and for different purposes than developed countries.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. The World Economy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2 |   HAUGE
The expansion of GVCs has invigorated debates on industrial policy.3 In particular, scholars that 
study development and industrialisation issues through the framework of GVCs have in recent years 
started to show a keen interest in if and how industrial policy in developing countries—specifically 
those industrial policies that are oriented towards GVC participation and international trade—has to 
change in this era of GVC expansion.4
Many of these scholars argue for a new way of thinking about and formulating industrial policy. 
They question whether “traditional” industrial policies, like those implemented by the Asian “ti-
gers,”5 can serve as a useful inspiration for today's developing countries. Milberg, Jiang, and Gereffi 
(2014, p. 152) state that:
Twentieth-century debates over the merits of industrial policy as a strategy for economic 
development occurred prior to the spread of these complex international production net-
works. Industrial policy viewed through the lens of GVCs will thus differ from traditional 
3 This paper will stick to a definition of industrial policy as detailed in Chang, Hauge, and Irfan (2016, 26), which is, “A 
policy that deliberately favours particular industries—or even firms—over others, against market signals, usually to enhance 
efficiency and to promote productivity growth for the targeted industries as well as for the whole economy.” The “whole 
economy” is an important part of the definition, as it implies that this paper adopts a broad understanding of industrial policy.
4 The most important publications are Baldwin (2011), Gereffi (2014a), Gereffi and Sturgeon (2013) and Milberg et al. 
(2014). International organisations are also increasingly devoting attention to the topic, such as the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). See Milberg et al. (2014) 
for an overview of publications from these international organisations that concern the topic.
5 Most commonly referring to South Korea and Taiwan, but also includes Hong Kong and Singapore.
F I G U R E  1  World exports and imports, 1990–2017
Data source: World Development Indicators (2019).
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arguments for industrial policy. The GVC approach puts emphasis on firms rather than 
States, leaving the role of the State less evident than it was in earlier phases of late 
industrialization.
Similarly, Gereffi (2014a) argues that there is not likely to be a return of ISI (import substitution 
industrialisation) and EOI (export-oriented industrialisation) policies of old.6 As a result of the global-
isation of production, “companies, localities, and entire countries have come to occupy specialized 
niches within GVCs. Because of this, today's industrial policies have a different character and generate 
different outcomes than before” (Gereffi, 2014a, p. 438). In a related vein, Baldwin (2011) criticises 
“high development theory”—explicitly referring to those theories that advocate structural transforma-
tion based on emulation of previously successful industrialisation experiences—for not fully taking 
into account revolutionary transformations in industry that have occurred since the mid-1980s. He 
suggests that the missing element boils down to GVCs. “Before 1985, successful industrialisation 
meant building a domestic supply chain. Today, industrialisers join supply chains and grow rapidly 
because offshored production brings elements that took Korea and Taiwan decades to develop domes-
tically” (Baldwin, 2011, p. 3).
The closest thing to a synthesis of this “GVC perspective,” if I may call it that, on the ways in 
which industrial policy needs to change is the paper by Milberg et al. (2014). They argue that: (a) 
industrial policy must shift from the traditional stance aimed at developing fully integrated produc-
tion structures (i.e., developing entire industries domestically) to a stance focusing on moving into 
higher-valued tasks associated with a certain industry. This is also known as vertical specialisation; 
(b) while traditional industrial policy may have included protection of domestic industry, success in 
6 Export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) refers to trade and economic policy that aims to speed up the industrialisation of a 
country through exports. Import substitution industrialisation (ISI) refers to trade and economic policy which advocates 
replacing foreign imports with domestic production.
F I G U R E  2  FDI inflows to developing countries, 1990–2017
Data source: UNCTAD (2019).
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the era of GVC expansion requires easy and cheap access to imports, in particular for necessary 
intermediates; and  (c) whereas traditional industrial policy sought to build domestic capacity in 
order to eventually compete with leading transnational corporations (TNCs), industrial policy now-
adays should focus more on negotiating and linking up to TNCs, as the issues facing firms and 
governments these days require moving up through the chain of production of a particular commod-
ity or set of commodities.7
In this paper, I develop a critique of the GVC perspective on industrial policy. It is important that the 
word “critique” is interpreted correctly here. By being critical, I most importantly mean scrutinising 
claims to see how far they are convincing. And by being critical, I do not by default disagree. In fact, I 
think the GVC perspective contains many useful insights on industrial policy, which I will make clear 
throughout the paper. But, as I will show, I also think it has shortcomings. My hope is that this new 
and useful GVC perspective on industrial policy works towards a more nuanced integration of an older 
perspective of industrial policy, the “developmentalist perspective,” which I will elaborate on below.
I will develop my critique by drawing on the industrialisation experiences of South Korea and 
Taiwan, arguably the two most successful examples of economic catch-up and late industrialisation 
throughout the history of capitalism. In particular, I will draw on the GVC-oriented industrial policies 
that these two countries formulated during their rapid economic growth and industrialisation between 
roughly 1960 and 1990.
The paper does not aim to “bring to light” unknown aspects of South Korea's and Taiwan's indus-
trial policies. The industrialisation experiences of the two countries in this time period are well-doc-
umented. However, as shown through the above discussion, the GVC perspective juxtaposes its new 
framework for industrial policy against the successful catch-up and industrialisation experiences of 
the second half of the twentieth century, in particular the “traditional” industrial policies of these two 
countries. Therefore, looking at if and how GVC-oriented industrial policies were formulated in these 
two countries can serve as a useful starting point for a critical discussion. In fact, part of the motiva-
tion for writing this paper is to show that GVC-oriented industrial policies in South Korea and Taiwan 
actually existed and have some continued relevance as lessons for today’s catch-up economies.
In its analysis, the GVC perspective does not sufficiently incorporate the most well-known per-
spective through which industrial policy in South Korea and Taiwan has been analysed—what I will 
refer to in this paper as the “developmentalist perspective.” The developmentalist perspective has its 
roots the fields of political economy and the historical school of economics. Scholars who work in this 
tradition study the process of economic development through careful case-study analysis of domestic 
political economy, often through rigorous primary data collection from the relevant cases/countries 
while also paying attention to global economic dimensions. They focus first and foremost on under-
standing the “real” economy and policy implications, rather than producing grand theories (this is not 
to say that the GVC perspective neglects policy implications or study of the real economy). One of 
the most important figures in the tradition was in fact a policymaker: Alexander Hamilton, the first 
US Secretary of the Treasury. He laid out the groundwork for what has become known as the infant 
industry argument, which in short is an economic rationale for trade protectionism.
The developmentalist perspective understands the process of economic development as a pro-
cess of developing productive capabilities, primarily through industrialisation, and it sees the 
state as an active player in this process. In its modern form, the developmentalist tradition was 
advanced by economists such as Albert Hirschman, Arthur Lewis, Simon Kuznets, and Gunnar 
7 The article actually identifies six challenges to industrial policy in the era of GVC expansion, but when addressing how 
industrial policy should change, in particular relating to the issues that will be addressed in this paper, they can most 
importantly be reduced to these three.
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Myrdal (Chang, 2014). The perspective became particularly well-known in development stud-
ies after it produced influential works on the industrialisation and development experiences of 
East Asian economies, some seminal works being Amsden (1989), Chang (1994), Evans (1995), 
Johnson (1982) and Wade (1990).
In this paper, I will draw mostly on the trade and globalisation aspect of this literature as it relates 
to South Korea and Taiwan, therefore building mostly on Amsden, Chang and Wade (among these 
seminal works). By looking at the GVC-oriented industrial policies of South Korea and Taiwan—
from predominantly a developmentalist perspective while incorporating the GVC perspective (an ap-
proach that has not been taken before)—two important critiques of the GVC perspective will emerge 
in this paper.
First, while the massive expansion of GVCs started picking up pace most notably since the 1990s, 
South Korea and Taiwan did not industrialise in a world devoid of GVCs. These two countries actually 
utilised GVCs in the process of industrialisation. Nike, one of today's largest brand names in the global 
footwear and sporting outfit industry, outsourced almost all of its shoe production to South Korea and 
Taiwan from the late 1970s to the late 1980s (Chang et al., 2016). Even before that, in the late 1950s, 
Taiwan started carrying out massive assembly operations for Japanese companies on electronic con-
sumer goods, including televisions, refrigerators, air conditioners, automobiles, diesel engines and sev-
eral other items (Wade, 1990).
Second, given the importance of GVC participation for the industrialisation of South Korea and 
Taiwan, this might actually mean that the expansion of GVCs does not require the thorough “rethink” of 
industrial policy that the GVC perspective suggests and that there are still plenty of lessons to be learnt 
from these industrialisation experiences for today's catch-up economies. By reviewing the part of the 
developmentalist perspective that is relevant for this paper's analysis, we will actually see that there ex-
ists a rigorous literature on industrial policy related to trade and foreign investment that does not use the 
term “GVC,” even though GVC participation has been important in the cases referred to in this literature. 
It seems to have been overlooked by the GVC perspective, but it is important because we can get key 
insights into the type of industrial policies (through GVC participation) that has resulted in successful 
industrialisation. Part of the developmentalist perspective also goes beyond the GVC perspective's di-
chotomy between ISI and EOI, showing especially with reference to South Korea and Taiwan how both 
protectionist policies and export-oriented policies often operated in tandem with one another.
Before I move on to the detailed investigation of industrial policy in South Korea and Taiwan, it 
is important that I highlight a few more points about this so-called GVC perspective. The literature 
that I presented so far on this perspective is not exhaustive and should certainly not be interpreted as 
representative of the entire literature on GVCs and development. And while the GVC literature has 
for a long time come under criticism for not properly incorporating the role of the state in economic 
development, this is now starting to change. Horner and Alford (2019) provide a rich overview of the 
emerging literature on the role of the state in global value chains, highlighting new contributions on 
the role of the state in relation to GVCs as facilitator, regulator, producer and buyer. And if we do not 
limit ourselves to looking only at those contributions specifically using the term “industrial policy,” 
but for example the role of the state in “industrial upgrading,” the number of contributions from the 
GVC perspective increases. In fact, many of them highlight state interventions similar to those high-
lighted by the developmentalist perspective. For example, Taglioni and Winkler (2016) discuss the 
usefulness of joint ventures as a strategy for facilitating technological spillovers and know-how from 
foreign companies to the domestic economy. Kaplinsky and Morris (2015) talk about the dangers of 
focusing too much on industrial thinning, an implicit critique of one of the arguments by Milberg et 
al. (2014) that I mentioned above. And in the recently published Handbook on global value chains by 
Ponte, Gereffi, and Raj-Reichert (2019), there are many useful contributions on industrial upgrading 
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and the role of the state in GVCs, for example by Gereffi (2019), Morris and Staritz (2019) and Staritz 
and Whitfield (2019).
One can also find examples of recent scholarship leaning towards the developmentalist perspective 
but actively drawing on GVC literature. For example, Andreoni (2019) combines literature from the 
two perspectives to build a generalized linkage approach to local production systems development. 
Behuria (2019) uses insights from the political settlements literature (which arguably is a branch of the 
developmentalist literature) as a contribution to the growing agenda within the GVC literature and the 
related global production network (GNP) literature (Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002; 
Neilson, 2014; Yeung & Coe, 2015) to examine how the role of the state and domestic politics shape 
upgrading in GVCs in developing countries.
As seen, the lines between these two perspectives are sometimes blurry, as they should be. Both 
perspectives have made substantial contributions to theories of economic developmentand industri-
alisation. The developmentalist perspective has focused more on the role of the state in this process, 
whereas the GVC perspective has focused more on global dynamics, particularly international rela-
tionships between firms.
There are probably many scholars who do not confine themselves to either perspective, which 
is completely fine. But for the purpose of this exercise, it is useful to attempt to identify some 
differences, especially if writing on GVC-oriented industrial policy. Throughout the paper, what I 
deem to be the shortcomings of the new GVC perspective on industrial policy will become clearer 
(and also where the GVC perspective and the developmentalist perspective overlap). It is especially 
the slightly ahistorical nature of recent contributions in the GVC literature that I want to highlight. 
And do keep in mind that it is primarily those articles in the GVC literature that specifically talk 
about industrial policy that aim my critique at—not the entire literature on GVCs, development and 
industrial upgrading.
Here follows an outline of the paper:
In Section 2, I review the GVC-oriented industrial policies of South Korea and Taiwan mainly 
from the developmentalist perspective. I do not aim to be novel in the sense of presenting “new” 
industrial policies that the developmentalist perspective has not incorporated thus far, but rather, I 
synthesise those industrial policies that are GVC-oriented in an attempt to add useful elements to the 
framework of industrial policy that the GVC perspective has proposed.
In Section 3, I present a new framework for GVC-oriented industrial policies for today's developing 
countries, starting with the framework proposed by the GVC perspective, but building on it with the 
critique made thus far in the paper. I should emphasise that this framework should not be understood 
as a general industrial policy framework. Such an exercise is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Rather, it is framework that tries to answer specifically if and how an aspect of globalisation, that is 
the expansion of global value chains, should affect the tools of industrial policy in developing coun-
tries. As such, an important caveat should be mentioned. Formulating successful industrial policy is 
not only about using the right tools, but also about the determinants of state effectiveness. There is a 
vast literature on those determinants, but this will not be addressed in this paper.8 The reason is that 
the aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences that an external change (i.e., the expansion of 
8 In the context of the East Asian development experience, Woo-Cumings (1999), an edited volume, summarises many of the 
seminal contributions on the determinants of state effectiveness as it relates to industrial policy. For a more recent article on 
determinants of state effectiveness—more specifically, on contracting failures, enforcement and implementation issues—in 
the context of industrial policy in Asia, see Khan (2015).
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global value chains) has on the tools of industrial policy, and if developing countries now need to do 
things differently given this change.9
2 |  SOUTH KOREA'S AND TAIWAN'S GVC-ORIENTED 
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
As mentioned, a study of South Korea's and Taiwan's GVC-oriented industrial policies serves as a 
useful starting point for moving towards a “GVC–developmentalist nexus,” as the GVC literature 
does not cover the role of industrial policy in these two countries sufficiently. Additionally, from an 
emulation standpoint for today's catch-up economies, looking in particular at South Korea and Taiwan 
is useful.10 First, throughout the history of capitalism, no countries have grown as rapidly from low- to 
high-income and industrialised as fast as South Korea and Taiwan did from roughly 1960–90. These 
two countries are arguably the most successful examples of catch-up industrialisation. And because of 
their decently sized domestic markets, they hold more general lessons for today's developing countries 
than, for example, the two other Asian tigers, Hong Kong and Singapore. These countries’ growth was 
more idiosyncratic. Most importantly, they did not begin from an agrarian or raw material base that is 
typically taken to be the starting point for industrialisation.
Second, looking at South Korea and Taiwan as possible case studies to emulate for today's devel-
oping countries is useful in a GVC context because the GVC literature is scarce on case studies of 
successful industrialisation experiences through GVC participation before the 1990s. Or rather, the 
GVC perspective is scarce on fully successful industrialisation experiences, as none of the developing 
countries that have experienced high growth and industrialisation starting in the 1990s or later have 
reached high-income status. One obvious explanation is that GVCs only started to proliferate after the 
1990s and that many scholars using the framework of GVCs find it irrelevant to look at growth expe-
riences before that time. However, I will make the case in this paper that participation in GVCs was 
very much a part of both South Korea's and Taiwan's industrial policy plans, as far back as the 1960s.
While a review of the most recent literature on industrial policy from the GVC perspective gives 
the impression that GVC participation was unimportant in South Korea's and Taiwan's industrialisa-
tion (as discussed in the introduction), there seems to be some recognition of GVC participation in 
these two countries in earlier articles by the GVC perspective. For example, focusing on apparel and 
electronics, Gereffi (1996) traces the growth success of various industries in Japan, and later in Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan by mastering the dynamics of GVC networks, moving from: (a) the 
assembly of manufactured goods, using imported components, to (b) original equipment manufac-
turing (OEM), whereby contractors make goods to be sold under a foreign company's brandname, 
to (c) original brand name manufacturing (OBM), whereby manufacturers make goods for export 
and sale under their own label. However, the GVC perspective, both in recent and in older articles, 
fails to incorporate the developmentalist literature on GVC-oriented industrial policies (the recent 
articles being a reference to the ones mentioned in the introduction). In analysing the growth that 
9 Although external changes can affect state effectiveness Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argue that different types 
of colonisation have produced different political institutions in developing countries, and Wade (2015) argues that external 
military threats shaped the East Asian development states), there is little evidence (or literature) on the link between the 
expansion of global value chains and state effectiveness.
10 If, in the first instance, one believes that emulation is useful. Certainly, if one goes down to the last detail, all experiences 
are unique, making exact emulation/replication impossible. But I would argue that this does not mean that we should never 
look at countries that developed under different conditions and at a different point in time.
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the Asian tigers experienced throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s through participation in GVCs, 
industrial policy seems to be waived off as unimportant by the GVC perspective. With reference to 
the light manufacturing industries, Gereffi (1996, p. 95) writes: “The East Asian NIEs tended not 
to use specific industrial policies to promote the booming exports of light manufacturing sectors in 
apparel, footwear and toys. State credit, trade, and labour intensive policies were supportive, but not 
determining.”
Much of the GVC literature also seems to claim that ISI and EOI are dichotomous, with EOI prov-
ing to be more successful (Baldwin, 2011; Gereffi, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2014a, 2014b; Gereffi & 
Sturgeon, 2013; Milberg et al., 2014). The general argument in this literature is that industrialisation 
processes in developing countries has undergone a gradual shift from ISI—a model primarily estab-
lished in Latin America, Eastern Europe and parts of Asia in the 1960s—to EOI, as established by the 
Asian tigers in the 1970s. Buttressed by the neoliberal thrust of the Reagan and Thatcher governments, 
EOI became the prevailing orthodoxy for developing economies around the world, according to 
Gereffi (2014b).11
This dichotomy is misleading. In Section 2.2 below, I will detail how a highly focused export 
strategy in South Korea and Taiwan ran in tandem with a complicated import substitution strategy—a 
strategy which had to balance the need for importing certain goods that were needed for the export 
strategy, while at the same time not eroding the possibilities for developing a domestic supplier base. 
Understanding these import/export strategies will be important for developing the industrial policy 
framework in Section 3.
In the subsections  below, I carry out an analysis of the GVC-oriented industrial policies 
in South Korea and Taiwan between 1960 and 1990. I do so by drawing primarily on the de-
velopmentalist perspective—a perspective that adds new elements to the GVC literature's new 
framework for industrial policy. In Section 2.1, I discuss the importance of industrial policy for 
technology transfer from foreign to domestic firms, for creating backward linkages/promoting 
local content from foreign firms to the domestic economy and for learning about export markets. 
In Section 2.2, I try to add nuance to the ISI/EOI dichotomy that the GVC literature operates 
with when referring to the industrialisation experiences of the second half of the twentieth 
century.
2.1 | South Korea's and Taiwan's GVC-oriented industrial policies for 
technology transfer and local content in exports
2.1.1 | South Korea: the case of light manufacturing
It may seem odd to provide South Korea as an example of GVC integration. After all, the country is 
generally known to have had a restrictive stance towards foreign investors. From 1960 to 1990, FDI 
inflows as share of total foreign capital inflows (except foreign aid) in the country were a mere 5%, 
among the world's lowest (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 2006). After almost half a century of Japanese co-
lonialism, there was a strong desire to avoid foreign domination of the economy. Consequently, there 
11 It must be mentioned that although the ISI/EOI dichotomy is prevalent in the GVC lens, some of its weaknesses are pointed 
out. Gereffi (2014b, p. 11) writes: “the development story for East Asian and other newly industrializing economies cannot be 
captured solely through a contrast of the ISI and EOI models, since the shift from ISI to EOI was not total or uncontested in 
either East Asia or Latin America. Indeed, elements of both strategies were intertwined since countries tended to move from 
relatively easy to more difficult phases of both ISI and EOI over time.” However, this lacks further elaboration.
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was a preference for borrowing over FDI (Thurbon & Weiss, 2006). The FDI that was permitted was 
heavily regulated to ensure that it delivered benefits to the national economy, usually as specified by 
the Economic Planning Board.
However, while FDI inflows to South Korea have been low, the export-focused light manufactur-
ing industry is in some ways an exception, especially with respect to Japanese foreign investments. 
Moreover, FDI inflows do not capture all the international subcontracting practices that were preva-
lent in many of the East Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s, whereby supplier firms in the value 
chains were domestically owned (Milberg et al., 2014). As I will explain below, this type of GVC 
participation was important in South Korea.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the textile, apparel and footwear industry was the highest 
earning merchandise export category in South Korea (Amsden, 1989, 2001).12 As mentioned, FDI 
accounted for a small share of total foreign capital in the country, but in some manufacturing indus-
tries, it has been significant—for example in the textile industry, this share amounted to 20% in 
1974 (Chibber, 1999). Close ties to Japan have been especially important for the industry.13 First of 
all, Japan's own industrialisation agenda has been crucial. By the late 1950s, the Japanese economy 
was well into its high-growth phase. Experiencing rising labour costs and thus endangering the 
competitiveness of its exports, Japan was looking for neighbouring markets to relocate labour-inten-
sive activities to. Japanese capital thus started entering South Korea through direct investments, 
joint ventures and subcontracting (Chibber, 1999). By the mid-1960s, South Korean firms were 
exporting all sorts of apparel, mostly to the Japanese and the US markets (Castley, 1997a), using 
imported inputs from Japan.
The way that relationships between South Korean firms and Japanese firms were formed, espe-
cially through joint ventures, was crucial for productivity growth of the Korean firms. It made tech-
nology transfer easier, thereby minimising the chance that Korean firms would get stuck with carrying 
out only low-value tasks in the GVCs.
On the one hand, willingness by the Japanese to form joint ventures with a minority stake played a 
helping hand. Between 1962 and 1974, 52% of Japanese direct investments in South Korea were with 
minority ownership, versus only 27% of US direct investments (Amsden, 1989). Joint ventures with 
the Japanese in which Koreans had majority stakes more easily facilitated the transfer of technological 
know-how (learning how to produce synthetic fibres was especially important), marketing skills and 
managerial techniques.
On the other hand, the Koreans systematically pushed for less Japanese involvement and a higher 
degree of national firm ownership (Singleton, 1997). As soon as possible, the Koreans invested in 
their own R&D facilities, and by the early 1980s, they had acquired the capability to design their own 
plants and had reduced import dependence by developing domestic production capabilities in syn-
thetic fibres, petrochemicals, spinning, weaving, dyeing and knitting. It is important to highlight that 
the Koreans did not develop their textile industry only to reduce import dependence of textile inputs in 
the apparel industry. Textiles, particularly synthetic fibres, were (and still are) considered more tech-
nologically advanced than apparel. They contributed significantly to export earnings in South Korea, 
especially in the light of the high protectionist barriers that the United States was starting to apply on 
traditional cotton textiles at the time (Chibber, 1999).
12 These days, textiles, apparel and footwear are not necessarily grouped into an industry—although one could perfectly argue 
that they could be, as textiles are crucial inputs for both footwear and apparel production—but in South Korea at the time, 
firms in textiles, apparel and footwear tended to cluster together (Singleton, 1997).
13 While diplomatic tensions were tense between South Korea and Japan in the 1960s, capital based in Japan, both Japanese 
and expatriate Korean, showed an immense interest in setting up operations in South Korea (Chibber, 1999).
10 |   HAUGE
Mutually reinforcing EOI and ISI policies were crucial to assist the growth of domestic firms 
in the industry and to help them become internationally competitive. Amsden (1989) argues that 
the import substitution of synthetic fibres made the textile industry more productive and less 
vulnerable to devaluations of the exchange rate. To compensate domestic fibre-using firms for 
“forcing” them to use domestically produced fibres, the Korean government subsidised inputs and 
handed out subsidised credit in return for meeting export performance targets (Singleton, 1997). 
Other important export promotion measures included preferential loans for operation and facility 
expansion, general tax and tariff exemptions on some imported inputs and wastage allowances 
(Kim, 1980).
An additional, but often neglected, part of South Korea's success in textiles, apparel and footwear 
is the attraction of Japanese trading companies. In the early 1960s, Koreans were lacking experience 
and knowledge of foreign markets, so facilitating cooperation with these trading companies proved 
crucial. With reference to the Japanese trading companies, Chibber (1999, pp. 330–331) writes:
These trading companies established links with Korean aspirants to the lucrative export 
markets of the United States and provided them with essential inputs as well as the ben-
efit of their sales and marketing networks. In turn, they were able to deliver the Korean 
firms as customers for capital goods to Japanese producers … This is especially true 
in the case of products where brand recognition and quality play a role, like synthetics, 
shoes, and so on—which formed the core of the Korean strategy in initial stages. In 
markets for these goods, not only is quality of central importance, but the initiative lies 
in the hands of the importer in the targeted country and not the exporter. Links to these 
importers, their trust, and their satisfaction reign supreme for export success.
The trading companies were especially important for establishing ties to the US markets. In 1966, 
Japan accounted for 82% of the textile, apparel and clothing market in the United States, whereas South 
Korea only accounted for 8%. By the early 1970s, the Koreans had made their entry, accounting for 31% 
of the US market, whereas the Japanese share had fallen to 52% (Castley, 1997b). By this time, 50% of 
South Korea's exports went to the United States (Castley, 1997a).
Over the 1980s, South Korea's products became even more prominent in the United States. For ex-
ample, Nike, which has for decades been one of the world's largest brand names in athletic footwear, 
originally outsourced most of its footwear production to Japan. But as costs in Japan started rising and 
South Korea started to develop productive capabilities in footwear production, heavy subcontracting 
relocated to South Korea. In 1982, 86% of Nike's athletic footwear was produced in South Korea and 
Taiwan (Locke, 2002). This system of outsourcing and subcontracting that started in the 1970s—with 
especially US retailers and brand names buying finished manufactured goods from foreign suppliers—is 
exactly what spurred the “buyer-driven value chain”14 classification in the GVC literature later on 
(Gereffi, 1994).
In summary, South Korea's success with GVC participation, especially in the light manufacturing 
industries, can be synthesised to the following: transferring technological know-how through joint 
ventures, pushing for increased local content and international competitiveness through both EOI and 
ISI policies, and learning about international markets through trading companies.
14 In buyer-driven value chains, large retailers and brand name merchandisers, such as today's Walmart and Nike, typically 
control the value chains and specify products to be produced in independent factories in developing countries.
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2.1.2 | Taiwan: managing FDI the 'right' way 
Like South Korea, Taiwan was in need of foreign capital during its early industrialisation phase. And, 
just like in South Korea, the fear of foreign domination of the economy was pervasive. But in Taiwan, 
foreign investment has been slightly more important and foreign borrowing less (Thurbon & Weiss, 
2006). Although FDI only accounted for 4% of gross domestic capital formation over the 1970s, on 
average (Wade, 1990), 20–25% of manufactured exports came from foreign firms in the 1970s (Lee 
& Liang, 1982).
The origin of foreign capital has been similar to that of South Korea, with most foreign investment 
coming from the United States, Japan and Hong Kong. This investment has not spread equally across 
industries. Textiles, apparel and footwear saw a great inflow of foreign capital, but the electronics in-
dustry has probably been more important for Taiwan. Over half of foreign firms’ exports in the 1970s 
were in electronics and electrical appliances, and foreign firms accounted for two-thirds or more of 
total exports from this industry (Wade, 1990).
The control of foreign firms operating in the domestic economy has been strict since the beginning 
of the industrialisation period, and the government made sure to utilise these investments for the de-
velopment of productive capabilities, as will be discussed next.
In the early 1960s, there were plenty of attributes that made Taiwan attractive to foreign inves-
tors, very similar to those of South Korea. US and Japanese firms were beginning to search for 
low-cost labour in nearby countries to relocate production to, Taiwan offered political stability 
and disciplined labour, and the country was linked to Japan from the colonial era and to the United 
States as an anti-Communist outpost. But the country did a good job in wooing foreign investors as 
well. Among other things, they offered 100% foreign ownership, guarantees against expropriation 
and 5-year tax holidays. Effort went into making foreign firms feel welcome, one common trick 
being to discover some personal connection between the firm and a senior in the Taiwan govern-
ment (Wade, 1990).
Taiwan has generally had a more welcoming FDI strategy than South Korea, but the government 
has bargained strategically with foreign investors, even in the 1960s, when the Taiwanese stance 
towards foreign investors has been considered relatively liberal. An oft-cited example is the permis-
sion given to the Singer Sewing Machine Company (US-based) to set up a plant in Taiwan in 1963. 
The permission granted by the Taiwanese government resulted in strenuous objections by more 
than 250 small domestically owned assemblers and suppliers. The government argued that inviting 
the American company to build a plant would save foreign exchange and improve the quality of 
locally made parts. To ensure this, it imposed that Singer locally procures 83% of required parts one 
year after commencing operation and that it assists Taiwan's local component producers in meeting 
specifications. The company did not meet the stringent local content requirements after a year, but 
ended up transferring a large amount of technology, upgrading the industry and boosting exports 
(Gold, 1986).
Another example of technology transfer is the polyethylene plant built in the early 1960s by the 
National Distillers and Chemical Corporation (again, a US-based firm). To attract the company, 
the Taiwanese government offered a five-year tax holiday, restrictions on imports of polyethylene 
for three years from start-up, guaranteed supplies of ethylene (an input that goes into making poly-
ethylene) and unlimited repatriation of profits. The Taiwanese government, in return, required that 
National Distiller should export any surpluses over domestic needs; not establish production facil-
ities in downstream sectors; and transfer 50% of shares to Chinese nationals after 5 years, so as to 
make it a 50–50 joint venture (Gold, 1981; Wade, 1990). The distiller plant successfully came on 
line in 1968.
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The Taiwanese government applied a stricter stance towards foreign investors starting in the 1970s. 
In labour-intensive manufacturing, FDI became more discouraged and it was faced with higher export 
requirements and local content requirements. Additionally, limits were placed on the extent to which 
foreign firms could capitalise on their technology—typically demanding that technology could not be 
valued more than 15% of the firm's equity contribution in the case of joint ventures. The intention of this 
was making the foreign firm commit more equity to the project at hand, thereby carrying more of the 
risk (Wade, 1990). Foreign investors did not always comply with the tough bargaining. For example, the 
Japanese automotive manufacturer, Toyota, withdrew from a joint venture in 1984 after concluding that 
the Taiwanese government insisted on too stringent local content requirements and export requirements: 
within eight years, 50% of cars were to be exported and local content was to rise to 90% (Wade, 1990).
However, local content policies in Taiwan have generally been successful, and the strategy of linking 
foreign firms with local suppliers through subcontracting practices became a staple of GVC-oriented 
industrial policies in Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s (see Aw, 2003 and Schive, 1990). Proactive in-
dustry associations were important in creating strong links between foreign and domestic firms. For 
example, the electronics industry association TEAMA (the Taiwan Electric Appliances Manufacturers’ 
Association) aggressively recruited members from both foreign and local firms and, with the support 
of the government, actively promoted the “local content programme” (Aw, 2003, p. 172). Domestic 
firms wanted to take advantage of the technology, management skills and sales networks of TNCs, and 
foreign producers stood to benefit from the local content programme because it reduced labour costs 
and lead times as long as domestics suppliers met quality standards. Consequently, TNCs started enthu-
siastically training local technicians, providing technical know-how and management skills to suppliers, 
and cooperated with technical schools on internship programmes (Aw, 2003).
Also starting in the 1970s, The Taiwanese government more actively worked to attract R&D from 
foreign companies, especially in high-tech sectors. Incentives included tax write-offs for R&D ac-
tivities conducted in Taiwan and reductions in taxes on technology imports. In return, foreign firms 
were often asked to establish research departments to train local personnel in advanced engineering 
activities (Wade, 1990).
Another important aspect of the GVC-participation strategy for Taiwan was learning about tech-
nologies and marketing by lead firms in GVCs without direct “bargaining” or “requirements.” For 
example, as Taiwanese supplier firms inserted themselves in GVCs led by large US retailers, such as 
J.C. Penney and Walmart, many of these retailers set up offices in Taiwan to deal directly with small 
manufacturers. Close links to these buyers were important for technology transfer. Levy (1988) argues 
that foreign buyers and traders were among the most important sources of technological information 
and support for SMEs in Taiwan. According to Aw (2003), foreign buyers, eager to purchase from 
cheaper sources, provided Taiwanese firms with technical assistance so that they could meet the for-
eign markets’ quality standards and specifications.
Compared to South Korea, Taiwan probably offered more incentives to attract FDI. But just like 
in the case of South Korea, Taiwan bargained with foreign investors to ensure technology transfer and 
growth of local content in exports.
2.2 | Breaking down the GVC perspective's misleading dichotomy between 
ISI and EOI in South Korea and Taiwan
Remember that the GVC perspective suggests a dichotomy between ISI and EOI, with EOI proving to 
be more successful. On this matter, the developmentalist perspective, with its greater in-depth reading 
on the role of the state in the East Asian countries, provides more nuanced insights. Certainly, like the 
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GVC perspective, part of the developmentalist perspective does indeed make a distinction between 
ISI and EOI, and one can somewhat plausibly argue that there was a shift from more to less protec-
tionism as South Korea and Taiwan underwent industrialisation (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). But at 
least the developmentalist perspective shows more clearly how ISI policies were important for the two 
countries’ growth strategies. It does not nearly exclusively attribute their catch-up to EOI. And, unlike 
the GVC perspective, the developmentalist perspective breaks down important details that show how 
protectionist policies featured in tandem with the export-oriented policies in South Korea and Taiwan.
Chang (1993) outlines many of these protectionist policies in South Korea: the bureaucracy re-
tained the power to impose emergency tariffs for items with excessively high import growth; quan-
titative restrictions and import area diversification regulations were pervasive—as late as 1982, 93% 
of total imports were subject to one or more such restrictions; prohibitive inland taxes were used to 
virtually ban the import of luxury consumer goods; and subsidised credit to firms who suffered in the 
short term from import substitution acted in effect as import restrictions.
In addition to these protectionist measures that were relatively visible, Leudde-Neurath (1988) 
provides an overview of import controls in South Korea of a more “covert” nature. For example, in 
1978, a government surveillance programme was launched to make sure that liberalisation measures 
did not cause problems to domestic suppliers. Second, a number of “special laws” on most imports 
almost invariably meant that import permission had to be obtained from a public agency. Third, an 
array of import taxes not specified as tariffs was often imposed when import of non-essential items 
was attempted (such as golf clubs, whisky and French wine). They were often labelled as an education 
tax, a defence tax or a just a special tax.
In Taiwan, ISI policies were featured perhaps more explicitly than in South Korea. In the mid-
1970s, almost half of the items in the tariff schedule still carried legal rates of over 40% (Wade, 1990). 
And, just like in South Korea, Taiwan applied a range of non-tariff barriers after starting to gradually 
reduce tariff rates after the mid-1970s. These included the tying of import licences to export per-
formance; restrictions on which countries imports can come from and who can import them (origin 
or agency restrictions); and “approval” mechanisms for import control: for firms wishing to import 
certain inputs, a reference check had to be made to make sure that domestic suppliers could not meet 
the would-be importer on price, quality and delivery, even if origin and agency restrictions were met 
(Wade, 1990).
The protectionist policies in both countries operated in tandem with a highly targeted export-ori-
ented strategy. Generally, both governments would give special favours and assistance to firms in 
exchange for meeting export performance targets (as outlined in some detail in Section 2.1). An ex-
port-focused strategy was particularly important for avoiding balance of payments constraints, es-
pecially to ease the import of capital goods. But the export-oriented strategies became something 
“bigger” than just a technical recognition of balance of payments constraints. In his “State of the 
Nation Message” on 16 January 1965, President Park Chung-hee of South Korea even called it the 
economic lifeline of the country:
To go with increased production, the government has set another major target – in-
creased exports … In a country which depends heavily on imported raw materials for its 
industries, export is the economic lifeline … For many years, Korea exported only $20m 
to $30m worth of goods a year …But in the past few years, the government and people 
awoke from sleep and strove. Exports began to expand rapidly. Last year, our exports 
exceeded the $120m mark … We have acquired the self-confidence that we, too, can suc-
cessfully compete with others in the international export race. 
(Amsden, 1989, pp. 68–69)
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Exports as a share of GNP in South Korea rose steadily from less than 5% in the 1950s to ~35% in the 
1980s. In tandem, imports as a per cent of GNP rose as well (driven by the capital goods imports), albeit 
at a slower rate (Amsden, 1989).
In Taiwan, from the early 1960s, several schemes were introduced to give positive discrimination 
in favour of export sales (for both domestic and foreign firms). Fiscal incentives, such as exemption 
of income tax for five years, were handed out to manufacturing firms provided that their exports 
equalled 50% or more of production (Lin, 1973). Concessional export credit, which had been limited 
in volume in the 1950s, was expanded. Other methods for stimulating exports included export credits, 
encouragement of export cartels, provision of marketing information and export prizes (Wade, 1990).
The export promotion strategy required a degree of liberalisation of imports of intermediate goods 
for export production. The system of tax rebates—which allowed exports to be exempt from taxes 
paid on imports used as export inputs—was amplified in the early 1960s. It was not a straightforward 
task designing this system of tax rebates. In order to distinguish imports used for exports and imports 
used for sale in the domestic market, an intricate system of thousands of input–output coefficients was 
created (Wade, 1991). Exporting firms were also able to obtain import licences needed for their own 
production more easily, but only if no domestic substitutes were available or if the price of domestic 
substitutes was 10% above the price of the corresponding import (Lin, 1973). As a result of these 
measures, the import content of exports in Taiwan rose fast, from 12.9% in 1961, to 19.7% in 1966, to 
25.5% in 1971 (Wade, 1990).
An important conclusion emerges at this point. Both South Korea and Taiwan were protectionist 
and liberal with their imports at the same time. This is no oxymoron—both countries realised that 
importing intermediate goods was necessary to “feed” the export strategy (and in South Korea's 
case, some were important for the acquisition of foreign technology through reverse engineering), 
but a full liberalisation of imports would create severe balance of payments problems and, in the 
case of intermediates in particular, constrain the growth of a domestic supplier industry. In other 
words, while ISI was a tricky business, EOI had an “unequivocal” green light. The export strategy 
relieved foreign exchange constraints, thereby enabling these countries to import necessary goods.
3 |  TOWARDS A GVC–DEVELOPMENTALIST NEXUS 
FOR GVC-ORIENTED INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
3.1 | The degree of state intervention in balancing trade openness/EOI and 
protectionism/ISI
The GVC perspective and the developmentalist perspective are complementary in many ways. But 
industrial policy prescriptions for today's developing countries could benefit from a stronger merg-
ing of the two perspectives especially with respect to the balance between trade openness/EOI and 
protectionism/ISI.
The GVC perspective has highlighted how industrial policy today should focus less on developing 
fully integrated production structures—especially through reducing the protection of domestic indus-
try—and more on having cheap and easy access to imports (Milberg et al., 2014). Recent successful 
industrialisation experiences show the benefits that elements of such a policy regime can bring about. 
For example, China's export success in manufacturing largely reflects its assembly activities through 
the use of imported inputs: the share of processing trade (exports that use duty-free imported inputs) 
in China's total trade increased rapidly since the 1990s, reaching almost 50% in 2011 (OECD, 2013).
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However, this kind of strategy can run into problems unless also merged with elements from the 
developmentalist perspective. So what should a nexus between the two perspectives look like for 
developing countries today? Let us look at Ethiopia, a good example to apply this kind of exercise 
to: it is a low-income country growing rapidly, and it has recently launched an ambitious industriali-
sation strategy and aims to industrialise largely through participating in GVCs (Oqubay, 2015). In its 
labour-intensive manufacturing industries, such as leather products and apparel, Ethiopia is attracting 
foreign investors to assist the export drive. To attract foreign investors, a range of financial incentives 
has been put in place, such as duty-free access to imported inputs and subsidies’ land lease (Hauge, 
2019). No “restrictions” have been put in place on the investors, only financial incentives to export. 
For example, the duty-free access to imported inputs is only available if the final product is exported. 
Overall, Ethiopia's strategy largely complies with the industrial policy formula prescribed by the GVC 
perspective.
The strategy seems to be working in terms of quick employment creation and growth in export 
earnings. But there are some worrying signs. One is the size of the import bill for imported inputs. 
For example, in the apparel sector, the import of fabric are growing faster than the export of apparel 
(Staritz, Plank, & Morris, 2016). Moreover, few linkages to domestic firms have been created, and 
exports are dominated by foreign firms (Hauge, 2019). Ultimately, for this strategy to be successful, 
domestic manufacturing firms need to become internationally competitive.
Unless Ethiopia finds a way to more strategically integrate into GVCs, they might end up like many 
other developing countries that liberalised without protection and/or a state that actively worked to 
make domestic firms more competitive, as well as foreign firms. For example, in Mexico, massive 
attraction of FDI into the Guadalajara IT enclave since the mid-1990s failed to transfer technology 
because the state did not proactively promote local learning, knowledge and innovation (Gallagher & 
Zarsky, 2007). Malaysia is another example, which is said to be in a “middle-income trap” because 
the state has failed to use GVC participation to develop productivity growth of the domestic economy 
(Cherif & Hasanov, 2015).
What can Ethiopia—and other developing countries in a similar situation—do differently? The 
story of South Korea and Taiwan holds useful lessons. Like Ethiopia, South Korea and Taiwan made 
sure to woo foreign investors. But unlike Ethiopia, South Korea and Taiwan bargained strategically 
with foreign investors to create linkages and transfer technology to the domestic economy. This was 
particularly done through joint venture requirements and local content requirements, as I have detailed 
through the two case studies. Their stance to foreign investors was far from lax.
But the developmentalist literature is not alone in prescribing these types of policies. The GVC 
literature highlights similar mechanisms. For example, Taglioni and Winkler (2016) explicitly rec-
ommend joint ventures as an effective strategy for facilitating technology transfer. As for the point on 
creating linkages and ensuring local content, there is no shortage of recommendations from the GVC 
literature. Kaplinsky and Morris (2015) warn against industrial “thinning,” a situation whereby par-
ticipation in GVCs without a strategy for creating domestic linkages results in the specialisation of a 
thin segment of the GVC with little technological content or value, such as assembly of manufactured 
goods. Cattaneo, Gereffi, Miroudot, and Taglioni (2013) explicitly state that maximising the benefits 
of GVC participation consists of capturing more value added through the improvement of backward 
linkages. Their recommendations for doing so include, among other things, requirements for new 
firms to create explicit supplier programmes and rewards for foreign companies that make an extra 
effort to help local suppliers.
However, the GVC perspective and the developmentalist perspective are different in two ways. The 
first is the degree of state intervention. Cattaneo et al. (2013, p. 36) suggest that governments should 
avoid “national content rules,” the rationale being that this negatively impacts the attractiveness of the 
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country for lead firms. Taglioni and Winkler (2016, p. 164) recommend developing countries to use 
industrial policy only “light-handedly” and be careful not to coerce foreign investors into joint ven-
tures with domestic firms. These arguments resonate with Gereffi’s (1996) claim that industrial policy 
in East Asia in the second half of the 20th century was not determining in promoting light manufac-
turing exports. The developmentalist perspective, on the other hand, argues that the degree of state 
intervention should be stronger. In the case of South Korea and Taiwan, local content requirements 
and joint venture requirements were important. And industrial policy was certainly determining, ac-
cording to this literature.
The second difference relates to the first and is arguably the most important because it more explicitly 
adds a new policy dimension from the developmentalist literature to the mix: namely the intricate bal-
ance between ISI and EOI. The GVC perspective is largely dismissive of ISI, but the developmentalist 
perspective shows how industrialisation did not work without ISI. In Section 2, especially 2.2, I went 
through the intricate policy designs related to both areas. Both South Korea and Taiwan realised that 
importing intermediate goods was necessary to “feed” the export strategy, but that a full liberalisation of 
imports would create severe balance of payment problems and, in the case of intermediates in particular, 
constrain the growth of a domestic supplier industry. A good way to think about the EOI-ISI strategy is 
through a system of “carrots and sticks”—financial favours given to firms only if they met targets related 
to performance, like export volumes and use of local content. For example, in Taiwan, export subsidies 
on manufactured goods were among the highest in the world in the 1960s, but exporting firms also faced 
stringent local content requirements (Wade, 1990). In South Korea, to develop a synthetic fibre industry, 
the government forced fibre-using apparel firms to use domestically produced fibres, which initially 
were more expensive and of poorer quality than imported fibres. In return, they gave fibre-using apparel 
firms credit subsidies and subsidised their purchase of inputs. If the firms met certain performance tar-
gets related to exports, these subsidies became more generous (Amsden, 1989).
A GVC–developmentalist nexus on industrial policy would recommend that countries like Ethiopia 
learn a bit more from the developmentalist perspective, particularly the carrots and sticks related to 
ISI. So far, Ethiopia has mostly focused on EOI. But if the government does not focus on how to 
design incentives for enhancing the competitiveness of domestic firms (both input-producing and 
non-input-producing firms), this will have damaging consequences for long-term productivity growth. 
However, with respect to ISI, one could argue that the current global economic system has made this 
more challenging. I will address this issue in my section further below, on how feasible it is to emulate 
South Korea and Taiwan.
3.2 | Link up to transnational corporations or compete against them?
Another important point advocated in the GVC literature is that whereas traditional industrial policy 
sought to build domestic capacity in order to eventually compete with leading TNCs, industrial policy 
nowadays should focus more on negotiating and linking up to TNCs (Milberg et al., 2014). The ration-
ale for this, in short, is that the economic development issues facing firms and governments these days 
require moving up through the chain of production of a particular commodity or set of commodities.
While industrialisation through linking up to TNCs/attracting FDI has become inevitable (and im-
portant) for developing countries who want to increase their participation in the global economy, this 
strategy warrants some scrutiny. One development we must pay careful attention to is the sheer power 
that TNCs based in the west have accumulated over the years through globalisation, and the conse-
quences this has for value added across different parts of the value chain. According to Nolan, Zhang, 
and Liu (2007), a handful of firms, predominantly based in the west, have accounted for 50% or more 
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of the market share in practically every global industry since about 2000. In essence, a small number 
of actors are appropriating increasing shares of profits over a larger market—profits arising from tech-
nological dominance, brand name recognition and privileged access to low-cost capital. Combined 
with increased competition among developing countries, this has especially made unskilled/low-tech 
segments of global value chains less profitable.
A popular depiction of this is the deepening of the “smiling curve,” a curve which was first pre-
sented by Stan Shih, Acer's Chief Executive Officer in the early 1990s. It suggests that since the 
1990s, manufacturing activities in global value chains—at least those focusing on assembly—are 
becoming less profitable (see Figure 3 for a version of the smiling curve). Some industry-specific case 
studies support the idea of the deepening of the smile. For example, Ali Yrkko, Rouvinen, Seppala, 
and Yla-Anttila (2011) found that only one-third of the value of a Nokia N95 phone comes from 
manufacturing: making the parts (33%)—processors, memory chips, integrated circuits, displays and 
cameras—and assembling the phone (2%). Two-thirds of the value comes from services, such as sup-
port services (30%), licences (4%), distribution (4%), retailing (11%) and operating profit (16%) (see 
Figure 3).
This development is certainly not missed out on in the GVC literature. Kaplinsky (2005) found that 
after sustained growth in the prices of traded manufactures until the early 1990s, we have witnessed an 
aggregate relative decline in these prices, most significantly for those exported by developing coun-
tries. Using more recent data, Milberg and Winkler (2013) find a similar result by looking at the price 
of manufactured imports from developing countries into the United States. They observe that clothing, 
footwear, textiles, furniture and toys have all experienced a 40% import price decline relative to US 
consumer prices from 1986 to 2006.
This means that by linking up to TNCs, developing countries risk being stuck with carrying out 
low-value production activities. This risk is higher today than a few decades ago, largely because of 
the increasing power asymmetries between TNCs based in the west and firms in developing countries. 
One obvious implication of this is that developing countries have to find a way “upgrade” in value 
chains to those activities that are, well, valuable. The GVC literature on “upgrading” is massive and 
suggests many ways by which to do so, and there is little point for me to reiterate this literature here.
F I G U R E  3  The growing smile of value chains
Data source: Author's creation based on numerous other versions.
Value added
R&D and design Manufacturing (assembly) Marketing and retail
Stage of production
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21st century value chain
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Another implication of the increasing power of TNCs based in the west is the importance of 
catch-up industrialisation strategies that aim to ultimately compete against the currently powerful 
TNCs or, at least, avoid linking up to TNCs initially. An important strategy in this regard is the es-
tablishment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In their review of the role of the state in global value 
chains, Horner and Alford (2019) actually highlight SOEs as a research area that the GVC literature 
has neglected.
The rationale behind setting up an SOE is that the government has the best ability to take on 
investments projects that involve high risks (e.g., not linking up to TNCs) but can potentially bring 
very high returns in the future. Both South Korea and Taiwan are instructive examples, and Taiwan 
is more well-known for creating a huge SOE sector. In 1952, the SOE sector in Taiwan accounted for 
57% of industrial production (Amsden, 1985). It gradually declined in importance, but still played 
an important role for a long time: between 1950 and 1980, the average investment share of SOEs in 
gross fixed capital formation in Taiwan was 32%, higher than that of other countries with sizeable 
SOE sectors in this time period, such as Singapore, South Korea and Brazil (Short, 1983). We have 
to turn to South Korea though for the best example of an SOE that grew to become a global giant. Its 
steel maker, POSCO, currently the fourth largest steel maker in the world, was established as an SOE 
in 1968. The World Bank actually advised the South Korean government strongly against supporting 
its steel industry at the time, as it was not aligned with the country's current comparative advantage 
(Wade, 2012).
While the global economy has changed in many ways since Taiwan and South Korea industrialised, 
SOEs are still abundant around the world. Many of the largest firms in the world are state-owned, includ-
ing 15 of the top 100 non-financial TNCs, as well as 41 of the top 100 TNCs from developing countries 
(Horner & Alford, 2019). And some of the fastest growing economies are the heaviest users. In China, 
51,000 firms are fully or partially owned by the state (Horner & Alford, 2019). In Vietnam, the three 
fastest growing manufacturing industries—shipbuilding, steel and apparel—have all followed the same 
model of initially establishing an “umbrella” SOE for the respective industry, responsible for setting up 
production facilities and coordinating investments by domestic firms (Chang et al., 2016). The contin-
ued importance of SOEs in industrialisation should give an indication that there are industrial policy 
pathways in the era of GVCs that are not confined to carrying out activities on the demands of TNCs.
3.3 | Why should we bother taking lessons from a time when things were 
different?
While I am ultimately suggesting that South Korea and Taiwan hold useful insights for today's devel-
oping countries, their development experiences had some unique features that should caution the idea 
that emulation is a straightforward task. For example, many studies on the East Asian development 
experience have stressed the “favourable” conditions under which South Korea and Taiwan developed, 
such as the surging world market demand of the 1950s and 1960s when these countries started their 
export drive, the legacy of Japanese colonialism which left behind a good base for manufacturing to 
thrive, and the high level of US aid to South Korea and Taiwan due to their strategic importance in 
the Cold War (See Chang, 2006, who discusses these theories, although does not endorse them). The 
positive legacy of Japanese colonialism is often highlighted. For example, Scitovsky (1985) points out 
that the Japanese built roads, railways, harbours and the beginnings of industry that South Korea and 
Taiwan had. Kohli (1994) emphasises that Japanese colonialism was different from European colonial 
projects in that it developed manufacturing industries in its main colonies, that is South Korea and 
Taiwan, which gave them an advantage in their subsequent industrialisation.
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The global trade environment was also different. Costs of trade were a lot higher, which reduced 
the competition that South Korea and Taiwan faced from other developing countries. International 
trade, cross-border investment flows and global value chains certainly existed, but the scale was lower 
(see Figures 1 and 2, which I presented in the introduction). The fact that fewer developing countries 
participated in world trade also meant that South Korea and Taiwan had more leverage to bargain with 
foreign investors, such as demanding joint ventures. Today, such bargaining is difficult without market 
power. This is probably why China—a country with more market power than any other developing 
country—is the most successful case in today's era of global trade in establishing joint ventures with 
investors from higher-income countries. Moreover, global rules and regulations on trade policies were 
more lax. Most importantly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) did not exist. Under the banner of 
promoting free and equal trade between countries, WTO members are, among other things, prohibited 
the use of local content requirements on FDI and export subsidies (Chang et al., 2016; Wade, 2003). 
These two factors combined gave South Korea and Taiwan more autonomy to formulate and exper-
iment with trade policies, both in the form of ISI and EOI. For example, these countries had more 
leverage with foreign investors with respect to local content requirements, they had more freedom to 
set tariffs at desired levels, and there were no global rules limiting the use of export subsidies.
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that South Korea and Taiwan did not have uniquely 
favourable conditions to industrialise. According to Kim (1991), the small infrastructural base in South 
Korea during Japanese rule was mostly destroyed during the Korean War of 1950–53. In Taiwan, when 
the country was transferred to the Republic of China after the Second World War, the new administration 
plundered most of the rents, according to Nordhaug (2008). Telephone lines in use per 1,000 inhabi-
tants—a common measure of a country's level of infrastructural development—were lower than 10 in both 
South Korea and Taiwan in 1960, similar to most countries in sub-Saharan Africa at that time. Per capita 
value added in manufacturing in the 1950s in South Korea and Taiwan was on par with most countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa at that time and far below that of most countries in Latin America (Chang, 2006).
With respect to trade, while lowered trade costs today have increased the competition among devel-
oping countries and given them less “policy space,” it has also enabled more developing countries to 
participate in the global system of production. Developing countries' share of low-tech manufacturing 
exports has almost tripled since 1980 (Hauge & Chang, 2019). In that sense, an export-led industrial-
isation model has become more accessible for developing countries.
With respect to WTO rules, there are quite a few loopholes around them (see Chang et al., 2016). 
First, many subsidies can still be legally used, for example subsidies for R&D and upgrading of dis-
advantaged regions. The idea is that it is not supposed to be a direct export subsidy. This means that 
one can also label a subsidy as a non-export subsidy, when in effect it is. Additionally, least developed 
countries are exempt from the ban on export subsidies. As for regulations on FDI, while local content 
requirements cannot be used legally, many other measures can, like those related to joint ventures, 
technology transfer agreements (see Taglioni and Winkler, for a range of policy recommendations for 
technology transfer) and limitations of foreign equity ownership. As for tariffs, although the WTO is 
working to lower tariffs worldwide, the rules are still lax and tariffs are certainly not illegal to use.
The most important point about WTO rules is that an action has to be challenged through a WTO 
dispute, and this challenge has to be successful before a trade policy instrument is removed. And even 
if this happens, the amount of time it could take for the challenge to be successful (normally it takes 
years) could allow for the trade policy to have had the intended effect.
The key point from this brief evaluation of the conditions under which South Korea and Taiwan de-
veloped is that we should be careful to assert that conditions underpinning South Korea's and Taiwan's 
industrialisation were so unique that developing countries today should not bother taking lessons from 
their strategies. Ex-ante, not many people predicted the rapid industrialisation of South Korea and 
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Taiwan. Ex-post, it is easy to be deterministic about various global conditions and the “uniqueness” 
of the East Asian development experience. If we go down to the last detail, every development expe-
rience is unique, both with respect to internal and external circumstances. But this does not mean that 
there is nothing to learn from these experiences.
4 |  CONCLUSION
Scholars that study industrialisation and economic development issues from a GVC perspective have 
in recent years showed an interest in if and how the expansion of GVCs should affect industrial policy 
in developing countries. While this perspective does not lack in diversity of opinions or can be said to 
encompass the entire literature on GVCs and development, the perspective does seem to merge around 
the view that industrial policy in developing countries today has to take a different form compared to the 
“traditional” policies that characterised the development path of the Asian tigers. Most importantly, the 
GVC perspective calls for an approach to industrial policy that (a) shifts its traditional stance aiming to 
develop fully integrated production structures to a stance focusing on specialised tasks associated with 
a certain industry and (b) that focuses more on linking up to TNCs, in contrast to traditional industrial 
policy, which emphasised building up domestic capacity in order to eventually compete with TNCs.
The GVC perspective's ideas for industrial policy contain useful insights, but they can be improved 
upon. In this paper, I suggested a framework for GVC-oriented industrial policy that merges the GVC 
perspective and the developmentalist perspective—the latter of which is  a perspective that industrial 
policy is most often analysed through, but which has been  somewhat neglected by the GVC perspective.
The main observation which serves as a rationale for this paper is that the GVC perspective too 
quickly dismisses the relevance of industrial policy in the East Asian development experience, par-
ticularly those in South Korea and Taiwan. The reason for this dismissal by the GVC perspective is 
in some ways obvious: the expansion of GVCs became notable only after the 1990s. This means that 
lessons one can take from the industrialisation experiences of the Asian tigers for a contemporary 
framework on GVC-oriented industrial policy are somewhat limited. But I show that GVCs actually 
existed pre-1990s, although on a smaller scale.
In Section 2 of the paper, I developed case studies of GVC-oriented industrial policies in South 
Korea and Taiwan, drawing mostly on the developmentalist perspective. These case studies then 
served as a basis for the policy framework in Section 3: “Towards a GVC–developmentalist nexus for 
GVC-oriented industrial policy in developing countries.” In the framework, I suggest that the GVC 
perspective's lessons for industrial policy would improve by more clearly acknowledging the continued 
importance of three observations by the developmentalist perspective: (a) the need for governments in 
catch-up economies to bargain with foreign investors for the purpose of domestic industrialisation; (b) 
policy design should not only focus on increasing exports, but also focus on replacing some imports 
with domestic production. This means that a liberal stance towards the import of inputs cannot have 
an unequivocal green light; and (c) linking up to the value chains of transnational corporations based 
in high-income countries can bring about some benefits, but ultimately, successful industrialisation 
necessitates a degree of challenging transnational corporations. State-owned enterprises have histori-
cally played an important role in this respect.
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